

Authentication and Authorisation for Research and Collaboration

Trust by Demonstration ... without overdoing it

Security Coordination Communications Challenges – all in it together

David Groep


AARC Community, policy and best practice area *Nikhef PDP programme*

Nikhef

WISE Community meeting April 2020

Many communities test, test, and test again





One test amongst many – but the first in the Sirtfi (eduGAIN) community



				Role Test 1		
		Incident	t Response Test Model for	Identity 1		
AARC2	we will further the work undertaken in AARC and provide a fram	m Organis	Organisations - Simulation #2			
Month	What	Contractual Date: Actual Date:	N/A <u>Drc</u> 16-11-2018	g/signi		
9	Incident Response Test Model for Organizations MNA3.3	Grant Agreement No.: Work Package: Task Item: Lead Partner:	730941 NA3 CERN	SP3		
10	Incident Simulation #1 Report	https://aarc-p	r(<u>oleth</u>	/shibb		
19	Incident Simulation #2 Report	https://aarc-p	AARC-1051 Guide to Federated Security Incident Response for Research Collaboration			
?	Guideline on Incident Response for Federation Participants	Draft at https		\mathcal{C}		
22	Report on Security Incident Response DNA3.2	Draft at https	2.5. Establish Secure Communication Channels in Advance			
			A key finding during Incident Response Simulations [AARC2-D 2018 was the need for established, secure communication cha security incident. Such channels should allow Federation and I Federation Participants and any potential third parties to easily share information. Significant work is required to understand th and to identify and provide a solution.	nnels in the event of a nterfederation Operators, communicate and safely		

https://aarc-project.eu/guidelines/aarc-i051/



The first tests with these participants were run 'by AARC'

Logical candidates that could all run the test

... and have an interest in knowing the result to establish trust

- eduGAIN
- GEANT.org
- but also any EOSC-HUB and e-Infrastructure CSIRT teams
- the IGTF (as it leverages federated id)
- each of the e-Infrastructures XSEDE, EGI, EUDAT, PRACE, OSG, HPCI, ...
- every research infra with an interest: WLCG, LSAAI, BBMRI, ELIXIR, ...

And any institution (or person) with access to <u>https://mds.edugain.org/</u> can run them, of course so in a short while, all the email in the world will be on Sirtfi Incident Response tests??



Trusted Introducer and TF-CSIRT

- 2-3 Reaction Tests per year
- supported by web click infrastructure, but requires (team) authentication

SURFcert challenges

• annual response challenges, just reply to email to a (traceable) ticket

IGTF RAT Communications Challenges

- every 1-2 years
- in parallel with continuous operational monitoring

yet we already listed 14 entities that have a real interest in running tests, 5000+ entities can claim the same

Challenge elements – what is valued or expected might differ ...

A single test and challenge can answer one or more of these questions

confidentialitu

investigative capability



• assessment supported with community controls (suspension) gives a baseline compliance

Communications challenges build 'confidence' and trust – an important social aspect!

- different tests bring complementary results: responsiveness vs. ability act , or do forensics
- unless you run the test yourself, you may not be growing more trust in the entities tested
- for a 'warm and fuzzy feeling of trust', share results: but this is sociologically still challenging ...

timelines



Target audiences and capabilities mostly have a 'natural' primary home

so that each 'target' does not get hit by many concurrent challenges

- e.g. eduGAIN to run communications challenges against Sirtfi email addresses
- the e-Infrastructures to test responsiveness of SPs and RPs with each RP/SP/Site having a primary e-Infra as its home? or can we jointly (EOSC-HUB) run these challenges per continent?


Communications challenges also build 'confidence' and trust – an important social aspect

- unless you test yourself, or get insight in the results of a challenge, trust may now grow enough
- so to get that 'warm and fuzzy feeling of trust', results could be shared
- and that sharing needs to be confidential as well, and granularity tunes to audience

IGFT RATCC4



IGTF RATCC4 Results



In total there are 91 trust anchors (root, intermediate, and issuing authorities) currently in the accredited bundle, managed by 60 organisations. Of the 60 organisations, 49 responded within one working day (82%), representing (incidentally) also 82% of the trust anchors. Within a few days more, 3 additional ones came in, and 4 more responded after a reminder. In total, 90% of the organisations responded to the challenge, representing 88% of the trust anchors.

11

NON

217-224



PS: of the non-response organisations,

4 had their public contact meta-data fixed, and 2 were withdrawn from the distribution

25-32

81-88

169-176

201-208

17-24



Coordination of 'CCs recipient groups' among participating infrastructures

• ensure targets are not overloaded by coinciding or overlapping challenges, for example by designating lead agency

Transitivity of trust based on challenge frequency and results


- for example by specifying the level of disclosure detail for CCs
- as extension: could CCs be requested e.g. in response to changed risk assessments between infrastructures?

Definition of CC models and classification

 'depth' of the CC testing is a balance between the level of trust gained (more profound testing and good results gives more trust) and expediency (asking mail or click response consumes less resources than requesting forensics of simulated incident)

Frequency of CCs

- simple communications challenges are often performed one or several times per year
- complex challenges are less frequent (e.g. 'black-box traceability' trials in EGI take place once every 1-2 years)
- following a CC model classification, propose an appropriate frequency for each class



Introduction and background

Maintaining trust between different infrastructures and domains depends largely on predictable responses by all parties involved. Many frameworks – e.g. SCI and Sirtfi – and groups such as the coordinated e-Infrastructures, the IGTF, and REFEDS, all promote mechanisms to publish security contact information, and have either explicit or implicit expectations on their remit, responsiveness, and level of confidentiality maintained. However, it is a well-recognised fact that data that is not

WISE SIG-ISM REFEDS IGTF

WISE SCCC-WG – participate!



WISE Commu	hity					IGTF-RATCC4-2019	
,						Campaign	IGTF-RATCC4-2019
Security Comn	Dashboard / / SC	CC-JWG		Period	October 2019		
Coordination V Communications Challange planning Created by David Groep, last modified on Oct 12, 2019						Initiator contact	Interoperable Global Trust Federation IGTF (rat@igtf.net)
						Target community	IGTF Accredited Identity Providers
Introduction and backgr						Target type	own constituency of accredited authorities
Maintaining trust between differer responses by all parties involved. N	Body	Last challenge	Campaign name	Next challenge	Campaign ı	Target community size	~90 entities, ~60 organisations, ~50 countries/economic areas
coordinated e-Infrastructures, the contact information, and have eith		November 2015		October 2019	IGTF-RATCC	Challenge format and depth	email to registered public contacts
and level of confidentiality maintai		March 2019	SSC 19.03 (8)				expecting human response (by email reply) within policy timeframe
verified becomes stale: security co infrastructure may later bounce, o		August 2019	TI Reaction Test	January 2019	TI Reaction	Current phase	Completed, summary available
One of the ways to ensure contact	5		January 2019	Theaction	Summary or report	Preliminary result: 82% prompt (1 working day) response, follow-up ongoing	

Campaign information

Campaigns can target different constituencies and may overlap. The description of the constituency given here should be sufficient for a h detailed description or a list of addresses (which would be a privacy concern since this page is public). Challenges can also probe to different

WISE, SIGISM, REFEDS, TI joint working group

see wise-community.org and join!

https://wiki.geant.org/display/WISE/SCCC-JWG

compare their performance agains

co-chairs: Hannah Short (CERN) and David Groep (Nikhef)



- How to grow the community and leverage the trust built?
- Can we use joint machinery for running challenges? eduGAIN, EGI, TI, SURF all have tooling, and more is coming
- The Wiki page is a start evolution and completeness requires you!

And beyond communications, there is more to be had:

- **1.** Crisis exercises the true test of readiness, and a great way of being prepared! look at the great things Charlie et al. are doing, like CLAW ⁽ⁱ⁾
- 2. eduGAIN communications and crises simulation join in the discussion see https://etherpad.servus.at/p/tiime19_edugain

Thank you Any Questions?

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https://aarc-community.org



© members of the AARC Community. The work leading to these results has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme and other sources. This work is part of a project that has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under Grant Agreement No. 731122 (GN4-2). We thank the following sources: EC Horizon 2020 projects GN4-3, EOSChub, and AARC-2; and the Dutch National e-Infrastructure coordinated by SURF