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*part of the work programme of
GEANT 5-1 EnCo, and AARC TREE*

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National e-Infrastructure coordinated by SURF*



IGTF Fabric Updates

status of our authorities and trust fabric news


March 2025

Meanwhile in the EUGridPMA+ ...

- EUGridPMA and IGTF distribution matters
 - constituency and developments
- Root migration update for EL9+ (or: why people bother the fetch-crl devs)
- TCS Gen5 update

EMEA area membership evolution

- Europe⁺: GEANT TCS, and CZ, DK(+FI+IS+NO+SE), HR, NL, PL, RO, SI, SK, AM, MD, ME, MK, RU, TR, UA, UK
- Middle East: IR, PK
- Africa: DZ, KE, MA
- CERN, RCauth.eu



Membership and other changes

- Identity providers: both reduction and growth
 - migration to GEANT TCS continues
<https://wiki.geant.org/display/TCSNT/TCS+Participants+Sectigo>
 - CERN joined TCS via Renater (FR)
 - Discontinued: -GE, -BY, -PT, -AE, -FR
 - Suspended: -KE, -MK
- Self-audit review
 - Cosmin Nistor tracks the status on the PMA Wiki
 - real-time interaction between authority and reviewers helps, but ...
- .ch is now served by eMudhra

Updates in 1.133 and 1.134

Changes from 1.132 to 1.133

(XX February 2025)

- * Updated re-issued GridCanada root with extended validity period (CA)
- * Added GEANT TCS Generation 5 TLS ICAs and corresponding HARICA roots (EU)
- * updated SHA-256 root CA for RDIG mitigating EL9/FedoraCore deprication
- * MARGI put on hold due to domainname resolution issues (MK)

Changes from 1.133 to 1.134

(5 March 2025)

- * New ANSPGrid CA 2 roll-over for root-issuer key pair (BR)
- * Withdrawn discontinued AC-GRID-FR series authorities (FR)



Distribution signing key update

```
error: Verifying a signature using certificate  
D12E922822BE64D50146188BC32D99C83CDBBC71  
(EUGridPMA Distribution Signing Key 3 <info@eugridpma.org>) :  
Key C32D99C83CDBBC71 invalid: not signing capable
```










In Fedora Core 38+ (and thus later in its derivatives, and maybe soon in Debian), RSA 1024 package signing no longer supported by default (work-around with bespoke crypto-policies possible, not recommended)

Distribution key update

In future releases we move to a **new GPG package key**


- RSA-2048
- called GPG-KEY-EUGridPMA-RPM-4
- distributed with 1.122+ releases
- Retrieve new public key file from <https://dl.igtf.net/distribution/GPG-KEY-EUGridPMA-RPM-4>
- or from the public key servers: rsa/2048 dated 2023-07-29T12:06:23Z
- fingerprint: 565f 4528 ead3 f537 27b5 a2e9 b055 0056 **7634 1f1a**

Index of /distribution/egi

<u>Name</u>	<u>Last modified</u>	<u>Size</u>
 Parent Directory		-
 ca-policy-egi-cam-1.133-1-GPSK3/	2025-01-17 11:14	-
 ca-policy-egi-cam-1.133-1-GPSK4/	2025-01-17 11:16	-
 ca-policy-egi-cam-1.133-1/	2025-01-17 11:14	-
 current/	2025-01-17 11:14	-
 1.133-is-current	2025-01-14 13:39	0
 GPG-KEY-EUGridPMA-RPM-3	2025-01-17 11:12	889
 GPG-KEY-EUGridPMA-RPM-4	2025-01-17 11:12	1.8K
 Is-IR	2025-01-17 11:16	67K

Other CABF things to keep in mind

- Server SSL BR has already been updated
 - the provision for using DC prefixing has been retained
- But expect shorter validity periods in the future
 - start preparing for 90-day max in your service deployment automation systems
 - increased use of automation (ACME OV using client ID+secret)



```
[root@hekel ~]# certbot certonly \  
--standalone --non-interactive --agree-tos --email davidg@nikhef.nl \  
--server https://acme.sectigo.com/v2/GEANTOV \  
--eab-kid DUniqueID_forthisclient --eab-hmac-key mv_v3ryl0n9s3cr3tK3y \  
--domain hekel.nikhef.nl --cert-name OVGEANTcert
```



THE CHALLENGE OF SELF-SIGNED ROOTS

AND FF & REDHAT'S IDEA OF WHAT SELF-SIGNED MEANS ...

Rocky9+, AlmaLinux9+, RHEL9+ and

With RHEL9 also deprecating SHA-1, but *at the same time* still having self-signed SHA-1 based root certs in the ca-certificates package, depends on a RedHat/OSSL proprietary set of ‘bonus bits’ appended to the end of the ASN.1 certificate blob.

For the others, there is – for now – a policy override:

```
update-crypto-policies --set DEFAULT:SHA1
```

```
update-crypto-policies --set LEGACY
```

even if that is a rather course-grained and blunt tool

Mitigations: SHA migration

Still,

- if you still have a SHA-1 root
- and you are able to re-issue with the same key (and new serial)
- and your EECs *do not* have dirname+serial in their AKI

your CAs should probably re-issuing its root because that is just easier.

But:

- for large ones, esp. e.g. the DigiCert Assured ID Root (2006), that will be hard
- migrating to another (SHA-2 rooted) signing hierarchy will take at least 395 days ...
and a lot of engineering on the RP and CA side

Root cause is with RH not understanding what a self-signed trust anchor is, but that will not help us in the short term.

Reissuance of roots – state and progress

ASGCCA-2007

DZeScience

DigiCertGridRootCA-Root

KEK

MARGI

SRCE

TRGrid

ArmeSFo

CESNET-CA-Root

DigiCertAssuredIDRootCA-Root


IHEP-2013

RomanianGRID

SiGNET-CA

seegrid-ca-2013


Fixed by ‘now’: RDIG, GridCanada, CILogon basic/silver/OpenID, UKeScienceRoot-2007
Removed: DigiCertGridCA-*, DFN-GridGermany, CNIC, BYGCA , LIPCA, MARGI (suspended)
Pending withdrawal:



TCS Gen 5

by now 20 years of TCS ...

- based on a concept by Jan Meijer back in 2004
- driven primarily by the NREN constituency, but with the e-Infra use cases very much in mind
- NREN (GEANT constituency) requirements on public and (IGTF) authentication trust
- in a way that scales to 45 countries and >500k active certificates today, increasing steadily
- and also >10000 organisations, at varying states of automation maturity
- now in its 5th iteration: GlobalSign, Comodo, DigiCert, S***tigo, and now HARICA!



TCS: a stable constant factor





image source: Jan Meijer, 2008


Updates for TERENA – GEANT change in 2017

TCS G5 controls structure follows same model



Main IGTf relevant items

Europe joined TCS Gen 3 and Gen 4 on a large scale, so we keep it as similar as possible

- validation for server certs (CABF OV) and model for personal/robot **remains the same**
- **adherence to TCS CP/CPS (v2.2)** from Gen 4 TCS remains the same augmenting the publicly trusted accredited provider CP/CPS for joint trust
- so now on top of HARICA's CP and CPS  **HARICA**

HARICA: “Hellenic Academic & Research Institutions Certification Authority”

- GREEK UNIVERSITIES NETWORK (GUnet)
- University of Athens – Network Operation Center

See <https://www.harica.gr/>

Some background on TCS G5 backed by HARICA

The screenshot displays the TCS G5 eSignature web application interface. On the left is a sidebar menu with the following items: 'My Dashboard', 'eSign Documents', 'Certificate Requests', 'eSignatures' (highlighted), 'eSeals', 'Server', 'Code Signing', 'Email', 'Client Authentication', 'More', 'Validated Information', 'Data privacy statement', and 'Help / Guides'. The main content area features a progress bar at the top with three stages: '1. Request' (active), '2. Payment', and '3. Activation'. Below the progress bar is a horizontal timeline with five steps: 'Product', 'Details', 'Verification', 'Summary', and 'Submit'. The 'Product' step is currently selected, leading to a form titled 'Select the type of your certificate'. This form contains three expandable sections: 'Remote Qualified eSignature' (with a dropdown arrow), 'Qualified eSignature in cryptographic device (token)' (with a dropdown arrow), and 'Advanced eSignature (legacy Class B)' (with a dropdown arrow). Each section lists use cases such as contracts, transactions, and administrative procedures.

My Dashboard

eSign Documents

Certificate Requests

eSignatures

eSeals

Server

Code Signing

Email

Client Authentication

More

Validated Information

Data privacy statement

Help / Guides

1. Request 2. Payment 3. Activation

Product Details Verification Summary Submit

Select the type of your certificate

Remote Qualified eSignature ▼

Can be used in any situation, such as:

- Contracts (sales, employment, lease, insurance, etc)
- Transactions (e-commerce, online banking, etc)
- Administrative procedures (tax declarations, requests for birth certificates, etc)

Qualified eSignature in cryptographic device (token) ▼

Can be used in any situation, such as:

- Contracts (sales, employment, lease, insurance, etc)
- Transactions (e-commerce, online banking, etc)
- Administrative procedures (tax declarations, requests for birth certificates, etc)

Advanced eSignature (legacy Class B) ▼

Advanced eSignature certificate to sign documents.

My Dashboard

SSL

eSignature

Token

eSeal

S/MIME

Remote

Code Signing

Client Authentication

Valid Certificates

Product

Validity

Information

Remote

eSignature

IV

13/11/2025

C=NL,SURNAME=Groep,GIVENNA...



SSL

OV

21/01/2026

spiegel.nikhef.nl



IGTF specific updates

Updates in the (compact) Technical Addendum


- **it is a new hierarchy** (when installed correctly, ends in self-signed HARICA 2015)
- **keeps the current prefix** /DC=org/DC=terena/DC=tcs/...
- **issuer names changed as needed**, and since these show visibly in the UX
- **joint OV browser trust** (and mail agent trust for personal certs) retained
- **distributed** the new RSA Root and intermediates in 1.133 release (February '25)
- **continues both RSA and ECC**

and besides regular TCS and joint-trust products, there are nice new things: eIDAS remote vetting for qualified signatures, remote e-signature, European Trust List, ...

TCS G5 Technical Addendum

RFC 3647 – but only those section with stipulations are in:

- 1.3.1 Certification Authorities
- 2.1 Repositories
- 3.1.1 Types of Names (to highlight it remain the same)
- 3.1.5 Uniqueness of Names
allow for new SAML subject-id
- 7.1 Certificate profile
new root “CN=HARICA TLS RSA Root CA 2021”
- 7.1.4 Name forms
“The structure of subject distinguished names of TCS Authentication End Entity Certificates remains unchanged by this TA”



TLS joint-trust effects in ‘participants’ section 1.3.1

Server Certificate services

For the *Server Certificate* services, both OV web-public trusted and joint OV and IGTF Classic (OV) certificates are issued by the “HARICA OV TLS RSA” (2021) and “HARICA OV TLS ECC” (2021), and GEANT TCS specific “GEANT TLS RSA 1” and “GEANT TLS ECC 1” issuing CAs:

- <https://repo.harica.gr/certs/HARICA-OV-TLS-Sub-R1.der>
- <https://repo.harica.gr/certs/HARICA-OV-TLS-Sub-E1.der>
- <https://repo.harica.gr/certs/HARICA-GEANT-TLS-R1.der>
- <https://repo.harica.gr/certs/HARICA-GEANT-TLS-E1.der>

the difference between the OV and IGTF Classic (OV) certificates is solely in the profile of the end-entity certificates, where IGTF Classic (OV) profiles are prefixed with the domainComponent sequence assigned by GEANT to the TCS (“dc=org”, “dc=terena”, “dc=tcs”, in encoding-order in the subject distinguished name).

The root of trust for all Server certificates are the “HARICA TLS RSA Root CA 2021” and the “HARICA TLS ECC Root CA 2021”:

- <https://repo.harica.gr/certs/HARICA-TLS-Root-2021-RSA.der>
- <https://repo.harica.gr/certs/HARICA-TLS-Root-2021-ECC.der>

For transitional compatibility purposes, cross-signed certificates exist to the 2015 trust roots. All certificates are available from the HARICA Repository mentioned in section 2.1.

TCS Gen5 OV joint-trust certificates work

```
$ x509i tcs-ligbox.nikhef.nl/cert-ligbox.nikhef.nl.pem
Certificate:
  Data:
    Version: 3 (0x2)
    Serial Number:
      73:65:f1:60:95:cb:a5:a7:3d:d4:de:e2:e1:d5:37:35
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
    Issuer: C = GR, O = Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions CA, CN = GEANT TLS RSA 1
    Validity
      Not Before: Mar 17 01:16:28 2025 GMT
      Not After : Mar 17 01:16:28 2026 GMT
    Subject: DC = org, DC = terena, DC = tcs, C = NL, L = Amsterdam, O = Nikhef, CN = ligbox.nikhef.nl
    Subject Public Key Info:
      Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
      Public-Key: (4096 bit)
      Modulus:
        00:b5:32:91:bb:9e:43:f3:d9:c4:e5:b3:5a:a3:93:
        d2:50:40:0b:c2:b2:22:df:6f:2f:7a:0d:bc:b8:02:
```

but the ASCIIfication is still work in progress – for countries with more than 7 bits ...

Personal S/MIME and authentication

Personal Certificate service

For the *Personal (also known as email or S/MIME) Certificate* service, certificates are issued by the “GEANT S/MIME RSA 1” and “GEANT S/MIME ECC 1”:

- <https://repo.harica.gr/certs/HARICA-GEANT-SMIME-R1.der>
- <https://repo.harica.gr/certs/HARICA-GEANT-SMIME-E1.der>

The root of trust for Personal certificates is the “HARICA Client RSA/ECC Root CA 2021”

- <https://repo.harica.gr/certs/HARICA-Client-Root-2021-RSA.der>
- <https://repo.harica.gr/certs/HARICA-Client-Root-2021-ECC.der>

Authentication Certificate services

The *Personal Authentication, Personal Automated Authentication, and Organisation Authentication (Robot Email) Certificate* services, are issued by the “GEANT Authentication RSA 1” and “GEANT Authentication ECC 1”. These are provided in a subsequent version of this Addendum.

The root of trust for Authentication certificates is a private (enterprise specific) trust root for the GEANT TCS Research and Education community. These are provided in a subsequent version of this Addendum.

Other Certificate Services

Other certificate services, including Organisation validated S/MIME, OV and EV Code Signing, Qualified Certificates, and any IV certificates are not covered by this technical addendum.

Current state, January 2025

if you're connected to eduGAIN, TCS 'IGTF profile' end-entity certs just work

- native integration to eduGAIN via Seamless Access
- using the same authorisation model
 eduPersonEntitlement = urn:mace:terena.org:tcs:personal-user
- credentials are either CSR upload,
 or browser generated

On the to-do list

We got the trust roots and the TLS certificates,
we have mailbox-validated S/MIME, but ongoing items include

- Done: mechanism to actually *select* the IGTF OV joint-trust profile
subscriber access to joint-trust profiles in ~March,
just OV (and DV) for now
- ability to request Client Robot Email (org-role client authentication)
- client SAML authentication issuance (ePEntitlement based)
- S/MIME self-issuance

And, paraphrasing Wittgenstein, ...

„Wovon man nicht schreiben kann, darüber muss man sprechen“

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Questions?

BUILDING OUR GLOBAL TRUST FABRIC

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