



Authentication and Authorisation for Research and Collaboration

## WP3: Policy and Best Practice Harmonisation

David Groep



AARC2 Y1 EC Review  
26-27 June, 2016  
Lëtzebuerg



<https://g.nikhef.nl/aarc2na3py1>

# Agenda “NA3” Policy and Best Practice Harmonisation

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Team and partners

Objectives

Resource Use and Deliverables


Achievements

security, service- and researcher-centric policy,  
and community engagement

Challenges, **Status**, and **Outlook**

# Activity Structure



	T1	T2	T3	T4
<b>Activity Lead</b>	<b>Incident Response Trust</b>	<b>Service-centric Policy Support</b>	<b>Researcher-centric Support</b>	<b>Engagement &amp; Development</b>
				
<b>David Groep</b> Nikhef (NWO-I)	<b>Hannah Short</b> CERN	<b>Uros Stevanovic</b> KIT	<b>Ian Neilson</b> STFC RAL	<b>David Kelsey</b> STFC-RAL

## Partners



CSC-TIETEEN TIETOTEKNIIKAN KESKUS



Science & Technology  
Facilities Council





“**Minimise the number of divergent AAI policies and empower** identity providers, service providers and research communities **to identify interoperable policies”**”



Define a **reference framework** to enable different parties to compare policies and assess policy compatibility



Create (**baseline**) **policy requirements**, driven by the explicit needs of the research communities



Identify all necessary policy elements and **develop guidelines and assessment models to support communities** in establishing, adopting, or evolving their own policies

## Resources (1 May 2017 – 30 April 2018) and deliveries

Effort	PY1:	<i>23 PM foreseen in PY1</i>	<i>26 PM used in PY1</i>
Used	Total:	<i>47 PM for the entire duration approx. 2 FTE average</i>	<i>26 PM used in total <b>113% of forecast resources</b></i>

### 1 of 1 deliverable in PY1

DNA3.1 – Report on the coordination of accounting data sharing amongst Infrastructures (initial phase)

### 3 milestones in PY1

3 plans and periodic activity reports (MS12, MS13, MS14)

MNA3.3 Define and test a model for organisations to share account compromise information

MNA3.5 Inventory of high-assurance identity requirements from the AARC2 use cases

### With many other documents and results

... Community (security) policies in the Policy Development Kit, community guidance on using Codes of Conduct in the Blueprint Proxies, REFEDS Assurance Pilot, FIM4R community engagement, eduGAIN Sirtfi communications challenge, X-infrastructure assurance expression, social-ID assurance guide, ...

## Deliverable submission status

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**DNA3.1** Report on the coordination of accounting data sharing amongst Infrastructures (initial)

*In this (initial) phase focussing on giving guidance to the community on GDPR DPIA*

*communities and pilots not yet ready at this stage to consider composite accounting use cases  
2<sup>nd</sup> phase evolution (DNA3.4) will depend on advancement of actual need*



**MNA3.3** Define and test model for organisations to share account compromise information



**MNA3.5** Inventory of high-assurance identity requirements from the AARC2 use cases

## An evolving role for policy and best practices

Strengthened use case & community focus in AARC2



- **Policy Development Kit** as requested by the pilots
- **Consultancy role** for Communities & Infrastructures
- generalize guidance with **SCI and Snctfi structure**

- work items address policy aspects of the architecture & its envisioned implementation

### **AARC-G041**

*Expression of REFEDS RAF assurance components for identities derived from social media*

- or address pilots in SA1, communities, or Infrastructures

### **AARC-G040**

*Preliminary Policy Recommendations for the LS AAI (application to R&S and CoCo)*

+ ever closer **collaboration with Infrastructures** applying harmonization to their operations

By construction NA3 work 'homed' in sustained fora: WISE, IGTF, REFEDS, FIM4R

# A tour of the policy space in AARC2



## T1 Operational Security for FIM Communities



### GDPR-style Code of Conduct – a new way?

- Global sharing in controlled communities appears attractive
- Uncertainty about requirements (governing body) and timing (> Mar 2018) are not helpful for adoption today ... just yet
- Ongoing work: text needs to allow for (community) attribute authorities

## T2 supporting policies for Infrastructures

- Note that this is not formally BCR, so requires acceptance
- Collaborations (e.g. based around *Snctfi*) with content
- “Say what you do, and do as you say” – transparency is our real benefit towards the person whose data

**AARC-G014 Security Incident Response Trust Framework for Federated Identity**  
Sirtfi provides a mechanism to identify trusted, operationally secure eduGAIN participants and facilitate effective incident response collaboration.

**AARC-G015 Scalable Negotiator for a Community Trust Framework in Federated Infrastructures**  
The Snctfi Framework identifies operational and policy requirements to help establish trust between an Infrastructure and identity providers either in an RAE Federation or in another infrastructure, in each case joined via a Service Provider to Identity Provider proxy.

**AARC-G021 Exchange of specific assurance information between Infrastructures**  
Infrastructures and generic Infrastructures compose an 'effective' assurance profile derived from several sources, yet it is desirable to exchange the resulting assurance assertion obtained between Infrastructures so that it need not be re-computed by a requesting Infrastructure or Infrastructure service provider. This document describes the assurance profiles recommended to be used by the infrastructure AAI Proxies between infrastructures.



## 3 Community Operations Security Policy

## T4 Engagement and Coordination



## T3 support for Researchers & Community

### 1 ACCEPTABLE USE POLICY AND CONDITIONS OF USE

This policy is effective from 10/10/2016 and replaces an earlier version of this document. It is intended to be read together with all the policy documents in the Sirtfi repository. It is intended that you have read, understood and will abide by the terms and conditions of the resources/services provided as required by the body or bodies granting you access to the resources/services to perform work, or transfer data, policies and conditions of use as defined in the policy documents.

Baseline Assurance

Value	Cappuccino	Espresso
\$PREFIX/ID/unique	X	X
\$PREFIX/ID/no-epnn-reassign		
\$PREFIX/ID/epnn-reassign-1yr		
\$PREFIX/ID/local-enterprise	X	X
\$PREFIX/ID/assumed	X	X
\$PREFIX/ID/verified		X
\$PREFIX/AA/good-entropy	X	
\$PREFIX/AA/multi-factor		X
\$PREFIX/ATP/ePA-1m	X	X

**Negotiator for a Community Trust Framework in Federated Infrastructures (Snctfi)**

Abstract: This paper identifies operational and policy requirements to help establish trust between an Infrastructure and identity providers either in an RAE Federation or in another infrastructure, in each case joined via a Service Provider to Identity Provider proxy.

Address: This document is intended for use by the personnel responsible for the management, operation and security of an Infrastructure and those wishing to assess its trustworthiness.

# Policy and Best Practices Harmonisation




## Task 1

# Operational Security and Incident Response

# Security Incident Response in the Federated World

AARC-1  
Refresher

- How could we determine the scale of the incident?
  - Do useful logs exist?
  - Could logs be shared?
- Who should take responsibility for resolving the incident?
- How could we alert the identity providers and service providers involved?
- Could we ensure that information is shared confidentially, and reputations protected?



## Security Incident Response Trust Framework for Federated Identity

**Sirtfi** – based on Security for Collaborating Infrastructures (SCI) & FIM4R Recommendations

# A Security Incident Response Trust Framework – Sirtfi summary

## Operational Security

- Require that a security incident response capability exists with sufficient authority to mitigate, contain the spread of, and remediate the effects of an incident.

## Incident Response

- Assure confidentiality of information exchanged
- Identify trusted contacts
- Guarantee a response during collaboration

## Traceability

- Improve the usefulness of logs
- Ensure logs are kept in accordance with policy

## Participant Responsibilities

- Confirm that end users are aware of an appropriate AUP



# Sirtfi – presentation, training, adoption in AARC2

## IAM Online Europe

IAM Online Europe webinars are brought to you by AARC



### iamonlineEU 001 Sirtfi

IamOnline  
38 views · 4 days ago

<https://refeds.org/SIRTFI>

REFEDS > SIRTFI

sponse Trust Framework for Federated Identity (Sirtfi) aims to enable the coordination of incident response sations. This assurance framework comprises a list of assertions which an organisation can attest in order pliant. Visit our [Wiki](#) to discover how your organisation can prepare itself for Federated Incident Response

roup has been active since 2014 and combines expertise in operational security and incident response pol- DS community. Work to publish and implement the Sirtfi Trust Framework is supported by the [AARC](#)



**Benefits**

Why should I join? What are the **Benefits**?



**Sirtfi v 1.0**

View the **Sirtfi Framework**



**FAQs**

Need **help**?

Services increasingly **demand and use Sirtfi**

- *CERN & LCG, CILogon (US), RCauth.eu, IGTF-to-eduGAIN bridge*

and

**Sirtfi is included verbatim in the (GN4) DPCoCo version 2 to be submitted to EDPB**

Promotional activities successful

- REFEDS, Internet2 TechX, ISGC Taipei, TNC, TF-CSIRT, FIM4R, Kantara webinars, ...
- **Now 325 entities** (from 167 at start of AARC2)
- Ready to move to the next phase:

31-01-2018

**MNA3.3**

## Incident Response Test Model for Organisations


Deliverable MNA3.3

Contractual Date: 01-02-2018  
 Actual Date: 31-01-2018  
 Grant Agreement No.: 730941  
 Work Package: NA3  
 Task Item: TNA3.1  
 Lead Partner: CERN  
 Document Code:


Authors: H. Short (CERN), I. Neilson (STFC), D. Groep (Nikhef)

Contributions from: R. Vinot (CIRCL)

# Incident response process evolution in federations –Sirtfi




*Incident Response Communication, communication blocks*



## Challenges



- IdP appears outside the service’s security mandate
- Lack of contact or lack of trust in the IdP which to the SP is an unknown party
- IdP **fails to inform other affected SPs**, for fear of leaking data, of reputation, or just lack of interest and knowledge
- No established channels of communication, esp. not to federations themselves!



*Inter-Federation Incident Response Communication*

## Test model for incident response (MNA3.3)

- Defines the model actors
- include eduGAIN Support Desk (as per AARC-1 model)
- Exercise the model attack scenario!



parties involved in response challenge

Report-out see <https://wiki.geant.org/display/AARC/Incident+Response+Test+Model+for+Organizations>

# Post Simulation Interviews

Question	Response summary (9 responses received)
What went well?	The initial investigation was quick and responsive and Sirtfi contacts largely worked. eduGAIN support was helpful and included federation operators.
What didn't go well?	Lack of coordination. Delay in official alert. It was unclear who should be contacted. eduGAIN was brought in too late. The incident trigger was too vague. Investigation incomplete.



**Planned progress**

- More exercises, coordinated via WISE
- Improve available tooling
- Set defined roles, including a *coordinator*, and promote eduGAIN security capability GN4-\*



# Main achievements in Operational Security

Sirtfi training and guidance	→	Increased availability of security contact information in eduGAIN globally (167 → 325)
Incident response model test	→	Responsiveness during actual FIM incidents
	→	WISE group (developing) on coordinating security communications challenges
	→	Demonstrated need for federation-level engagement beyond just IdPs and home orgs with an eduGAIN Support Security Team
<b>PY2</b>	Attribute authority operations practice also for Infra proxies - in collaboration with IGTF	
	Trust groups and the exchange of (account) compromise information	

# Policy and Best Practices Harmonisation




## Task 2 Service Centric Policies

# A policy framework for service providers groups and proxies in the BPA

## Snctfi

*Scalable Negotiator for a Community Trust Framework in Federated Infrastructures*



Derived from **SCI**, the framework on *Security for Collaboration in Infrastructures*

**WISE** Information Security for **E**-infrastructures got global endorsement SCI in June 2017

# Filling the framework: generic and community-targeted guidance

**Guidelines**

The **AARC Guidelines** complement the **AARC Blueprint Architecture (BPA)** and the **policy best practices** recommended by the AARC project. The guidelines can apply to any topic that helps to advance Federated Identity Management for research and collaboration.

The AARC Guidelines help communities and infrastructures to implement and operate an AAI for research and collaboration more effectively and in an interoperable way.



Architecture Guidelines   Policy Guidelines   **Targeted Guidelines**   Upcoming Guidance

**AARC-G014 Security Incident Response Trust Framework for Federated Identity**  
 Snctfi provides a mechanism to identify trusted, operationally secure eduGAIN participants and facilitate effective incident response collaboration.  
 ... more information ...

**AARC-G015 Scalable Negotiator for a Community Trust Framework in Federated Infrastructures**  
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 ... more information ...

**AARC-G021 Exchange of specific assurance information between**  
 Infrastructures and generic e-Infrastructures comprise an 'effective' assurance profile derived by resulting assurance assertion obtained between infrastructures so that it need not be re-computed by the provider. This document describes the assurance profiles recommended to be used by the infrastructures.  
 ... more information ...

[aarc-project.eu/guidelines](http://aarc-project.eu/guidelines)


*Snctfi covers both service-centric and some researcher-centric policies*

Architecture Guidelines   Policy Guidelines   **Targeted Guidelines**   Upcoming Guidance

**AARC-G040 Preliminary Policy Recommendations for the LS AAI (application to R&S and CoCo)**  
 The Life Sciences AAI Service (LS AAI), developed in joint collaboration with EDI, EUDAT and GEANT, will result in a production-equivalent service to be operated for the Life Sciences community by the joint e-Infrastructures. As the pilot enters its second phase the LS AAI has to declare compliance to R&S and CoCo towards the R&E federations. This document provides preliminary guidance for the operators of the pilot LS AAI.  
 ... more information ...



# Implementing *Snctfi*: interpreting generic policies for BPA Proxy use cases



*REFEDS R&S: allow attribute flow from the IdPs, express intent and scope*

Research and Scholarship Entity

Publication History:

- v1.1 published 28th April 2014.
- v1.2 published 28th November 2014.
- v1.3 published 8th September 2016. (current)

Overview

Research and Education Federations are in the Research and Scholarship Entity Category with the release of attributes to Service Providers described below.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED" are used to indicate the level of requirement.

**GÉANT Data Protection Code of Conduct (GDPR Version)**

(GDPR Version)

2nd draft for consultation of version 2.0 (29 January 2018)

The work leading to this Code of Conduct has received funding from the European Community's Horizon2020 programme under Grant Agreement No. 731122 (G04-2). This work is © 2013-2018 GÉANT Ltd, used under a Creative Commons Attribution ShareAlike license (CC BY-SA 4.0)

*GEANT DPCoCo & GDPR - 'I'll be good with personal data'*

Casting policies into implementation and processes is a 'bridging process', requiring **policy and architecture expertise and knowledge of the community use case** – i.e. the ingredients that make AARC!

**Preliminary Policy Recommendations for the LS AAI (application to R&S and CoCo)**

Publication Date: 2018-03-01 (Final)

Authors: David Grice; Marcus Harri; David Höbner; Christos Kanioglou; Mikael Lindem; Ian Neilson; Hannah Short; Uros Stevanovic

Internal Reference: AARC-initial-LSAAI-policy-recommendations.docx



DOI: pending

Document Code: AARC-G040

© GEANT on behalf of the AARC project. The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community's Horizon2020 Programme under Grant Agreement No. 730941 (AARC2).

**Abstract**

The AARC Pilot covering the Life Sciences AAI service, including both the proxy components and the registry service, developed in joint collaboration with EGI, EUDAT and GEANT, is a multi-staged pilot that will result in a production-equivalent service to be operated for the Life Sciences community by the joint e-infrastructure. As the pilot enters its second phase, a practical policy related issue is that the LS AAI has to declare R&S and CoCo. In this document, NA3 aims to provide preliminary guidance for the operators of the pilot. It must be understood that this guidance may and likely will change, in particular if and when the GEANT Data Protection Code of Conduct has been formally approved by the European Data Protection Board, and when relevant components of the Policy Development Kit and the Aligned Acceptable Use Policy for infrastructures will be adopted.



*LSAAI Infrastructures: which components will do what?*

*AARC BPA: this is how information flows*

# AARC-G040

## AARC-G040: from generic Snctfi and DPCoCo to actionable statements

when a change in the set of subordinate service providers results in the need to ask for consent as per DPCoCo version 2. This is addressed by Snctfi RC1, which must be implemented by the LS AAI registry service. This information is also needed to effectuate collective incident response (RC4, RC5).

The LS AAI operators shall record for all end-users enough information to contact the user directly in case of security incidents, and to inform these users in case the acceptable use policy or data transfers to third parties change in a way that must be communicated to the users.

The LS AAI must not store personal data for any longer than necessary for the proper functioning of the LS AAI (which includes good incident response and similar duties, of course). It must define a data retention period for all personal data stored in the registry service, and have effective mechanisms to remove stale and obsolete data. The Code of Conduct version 2 draft suggests 18 months in absence of any more specific requirements.

# Accounting and infrastructure-use data protection: a bit of clarification ...


Work on accounting foresaw new communities joining AARC2 **processing more sensitive (and: more competitive) work flows**, creating need for sub-structure and protection of accounting data within the community itself

## Phased approach

**1.**  
Support communities to deal with general data protection issues  
Impact of GDPR for communities

**2.**  
Issue guidance on generic issues, such as assessing impact of infrastructure use

**PY2**  
Depending on stage of community development, may continue emphasis on targeted guidance



## GDPR for Infrastructure AAI – both FUD and legitimate concerns

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### Large discrepancy between practice, perception, and actual risk:

- communities don't see (or forget) need to protect infrastructure AAI (accounting) data – and don't even consider our AARC-1 guidance 😞
- others misunderstand the issue, over-state the risks, and fall victim to FUD law firms
- even 'simplified' documents - like the GEANT Data Protection Code of Conduct – considered too complex to be understood and implemented well



***DNA3.1*** “**assess privacy regulations on [accounting] data needed by service operators and e/r-infrastructures to ensure smooth and secure service operations**”

specifically purposed to answer the basic questions:

- how much impact does FIM have on your **research infrastructure and accounting data**?
- what guidance is there already from member state regulators to **help you determine risk**?

# A solution for our research communities?

View this email in your browser



Fancy an £80 voucher when protecting your information?

With just 8 DAYS TO GO, see why there has never been a better time to buy a shredder to help meet your GDPR obligations. Stocks are limited, and we have ensuring your sensitive documents are secure.

**£25 Cash Back**

Ruffles Direct Large Office High Capacity Micro-cut GDPR Shredder with



**High Capacity Micro-cut  
GDPR Shredder with**

# Guidance for research and generic Infrastructures – what is the risk?

## Initial phase: ‘impact of GDPR’ on community AAI risk assessments

*Interpretation of WP29 guidance is complex for average user. Example:*

- research is global, so: “cross-border transfer”
  - infrastructures have many users: “processed on a large scale?”
- EDPB says “in most cases, when meeting two or more criteria the data controller should conduct a DPIA”

*but how is a research community or Infrastructure to judge if this indeed applies to them?*

## DNA3.1 – released as AARC Guideline G042 to give concrete help for communities

- desk study of regulator and expert opinions scoped to research and collaboration
- guidance still evolving, national regulatory bodies not yet synced, but best available now!

Data Protection Impact Assessment - an initial guide for communities

Publication Date: 2018-04-30  
Authors: Uros Stevanovic, David Groep, Ian Neilson, Stefan Paetow, Wolfgang Penpe  
DOI: assignment deleted  
Document Code: AARC-G042

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The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community's Horizon2020 Programme under Grant Agreement No. 730941 (AARC2).

**Abstract**  
This report presents the results of the desk study on the evaluation of risks to (personal) data protection as considered in the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), for Infrastructures and their service providers that leverage federated identity management (FIM) to connect research and collaboration users.

AARC-G042

# Main achievements in Service-Centric Policy

Guidelines model for policy and architecture	➔	Clear adoption process for ‘consumers’ of AARC results, including targeted advice
Community Specific Guideline: LSAAI proxy operations (for R&S + DP CoCo)	➔	Support the move of LSAAI to full production
Guideline: Data Protection Impact Assessment	➔	Reduced complexity for communities and infrastructures handling (accounting) data

<b>PY2</b>	traceability and accounting data-collection policy framework based on SCI, providing a self-assessment methodology and comparison matrix for infrastructure services
	Evolution of data protection guidance for services – driven by the community needs

# Policy and Best Practices Harmonisation

By registering as a user you declare that you have read, understood and will abide by the following

1. You shall only use the resources/services to perform work, or transmit or store data consistent with the way you access.
2. You shall acknowledge of support or citation for your use of the resources/services for any purpose that is unlawful and not (attempt to) breach any applicable laws or regulations.
3. You shall not attempt to breach any applicable laws or regulations.
4. You shall not attempt to breach any applicable laws or regulations.
5. You shall not attempt to breach any applicable laws or regulations.
6. You shall not attempt to breach any applicable laws or regulations.
7. You shall not attempt to breach any applicable laws or regulations.

## Community Operations Security Policy

### 1 Introduction

This policy is effective from «start date» and replaces two earlier security policy documents [S1] and [S2]. This policy is one of a set of documents that together define the Security Policy [SP] and must be considered in conjunction with all the policy documents in the set.

This policy applies to the Community Manager and other designated Community management personnel. It places requirements on Communities and it governs their relationships with all Infrastructures with which they have a usage agreement. The Community management personnel must ensure awareness and acceptance, by the Community and its Users, of the responsibilities documented in this Policy.

### 2 Definitions

A Community is a group of individuals (Users), organised with a common purpose, jointly granted access to one or more Infrastructures. It may serve as an entity which acts as the interface between the individual Users and an Infrastructure. In general, the members of the Community will not need to separately negotiate access with Service Providers or Infrastructures (whether jointly called Infrastructures).

Examples of Communities include, but are not limited to: User groups, Virtual Organisations, Research Communities, Research Infrastructures, Virtual Research Communities, Projects, Communities authorised to use particular portals or gateways, and geographically organised communities.

### 3 Community Operations Security Policy

By participating in the Infrastructure, a Community Member agrees to the conditions set



## Task 3 e-Researcher Centric Policies

# Guidance for research communities in the Infrastructure ecosystem

## Authentication Assurance

- using both REFEDS RAF components as well as cross Infrastructure profiles
- considering social-ID authenticator assurance, complementing account linking in BPA

Exploit commonality between acceptable use policies to ease cross-infrastructure resource use

Support community management using *Snctfi* easing use of the generic e-Infrastructures  
*can you show community operations – sufficient to act as a one-stop registration for every Infrastructure?*

By registering as a user you declare that you have read, understood and will abide by the following

1. You shall only use the resources/services to perform work, or transmit or store data consistent with the purpose that is lawful and not (attempt to) breach confidentiality agreements.
2. You shall not use the resources/services for support or citation for your use of the resources/services.
3. You shall not use the resources/services for any purpose that is unlawful and not (attempt to) breach confidentiality agreements.
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
# Differentiated Assurance Profile – in eduGAIN and REFEDS

## Specific definitive guidance to IdPs and federations

- **Uniqueness** at least ePUID or ePTID/NameID
- **ID proofing:** ‘low’ (good for local use), ‘medium’ (Kantara LoA2, IGTF BIRCH, eIDAS low), or ‘high’ (Kantara LoA3, eIDAS substantial)
- **Authenticator:** devolved to REFEDS single and multi-factor authentication SFA and MFA
- **Freshness:** better than 1 month

**Any and all assurance profiles**  
organisational-level authority, also used locally for ‘real work’, good security practices


## Logical grouping and profiles for the Infrastructures



consolidation depends also on REFEDS SFA (which is not quite AARC...)


# Example: “Espresso” profile for demanding use cases

## “Espresso” for more demanding use cases



# Using the REFEDS Assurance Framework in practice: the RAF Pilot ☺

**Goal:** gain practical experience with Assurance framework *and* REFEDS Single-factor authentication (SFA) profile, both on specification and in deploying existing SAML products



**Today:** both IdP software (now mostly Shibboleth) can express components and profiles, and use cases can leverage REFEDS assurance profiles (Cappuccino, Espresso) directly

# Re-usable Assurance between Infrastructures

- BPA (community) proxy constructs identity based on multiple sources: home organisation, attributes, linked identities, authenticators – and process these with (community-specific) heuristics
- resulting assurance level may be different from one in home organization – and may depend on intelligence (components) that are not ‘passable’ to the next (infrastructure) proxy
- luckily: number of proxies in an exchange limited, and there’s explicit trust



each BPA IdP-SP proxy should convey its ‘established assurance’  
 use a **limited number of profiles** targeted  
 at Infrastructure and Services risk levels (not in IdP capabilities)  
**re-use existing profiles** as much as reasonable



## AARC-G021

Guideline on the exchange of specific assurance information between Infrastructures

AARC-G021															
Guideline on the exchange of specific assurance information between Infrastructures															
Publication Date: 2018-01-15 Authors: AARC Grant Agreement No.: 730941 Work Package: NA3 Task Item: TNA3 Lead Partner: Nikhef Document Code: AARC DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1173558 License: CC-BY	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 20%;">Name</td> <td>IGTF DOGWOOD</td> </tr> <tr> <td>SAML Identifier</td> <td>https://igtf.net/ap/authn-assurance/dogwood</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Other Identifier(s)</td> <td>IGTF-DOGWOOD urn:oid:1.2.840.113612.5.2.5.4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Description</td> <td>Persistent non-reassigned identifier, identity proofing sufficient to ensure non-reassignment of the identifier for the lifetime of the CSP. May contain marginally-verified real name resemblance or identifiers clearly identifiable as pseudonyms. No anonymous credentials permitted and issuance is traceable at time of issuance. Authenticator is secured according to best common practice (27-bit entropy as per NIST SP800-63v2, 2004) single factor or multi-factor authenticator, or compensatory controls on credential validity periods are in place. Identity and authenticator are managed by the CSP.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MUST</td> <td>https://igtf.net/ap/authn-assurance/dogwood</td> </tr> <tr> <td>SHOULD</td> <td>https://refeds.org/assurance/ID/unique the unique identifier should be specified in compliance with AARC-G020 "Uniquely identifying users across infrastructures" https://refeds.org/assurance/IAP/low https://refeds.org/profiles/ta https://refeds.org/assurance/ATP/ePA-1m urn:oid:1.2.840.113612.5.2.3.1.2.1 (1SCP IGTF file-protected soft keys) urn:oid:1.2.840.113612.5.4.1.1.1.5 (IGTF PKP Guidelines)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MAY</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	Name	IGTF DOGWOOD	SAML Identifier	https://igtf.net/ap/authn-assurance/dogwood	Other Identifier(s)	IGTF-DOGWOOD urn:oid:1.2.840.113612.5.2.5.4	Description	Persistent non-reassigned identifier, identity proofing sufficient to ensure non-reassignment of the identifier for the lifetime of the CSP. May contain marginally-verified real name resemblance or identifiers clearly identifiable as pseudonyms. No anonymous credentials permitted and issuance is traceable at time of issuance. Authenticator is secured according to best common practice (27-bit entropy as per NIST SP800-63v2, 2004) single factor or multi-factor authenticator, or compensatory controls on credential validity periods are in place. Identity and authenticator are managed by the CSP.	MUST	https://igtf.net/ap/authn-assurance/dogwood	SHOULD	https://refeds.org/assurance/ID/unique the unique identifier should be specified in compliance with AARC-G020 "Uniquely identifying users across infrastructures" https://refeds.org/assurance/IAP/low https://refeds.org/profiles/ta https://refeds.org/assurance/ATP/ePA-1m urn:oid:1.2.840.113612.5.2.3.1.2.1 (1SCP IGTF file-protected soft keys) urn:oid:1.2.840.113612.5.4.1.1.1.5 (IGTF PKP Guidelines)	MAY	
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SAML Identifier	https://igtf.net/ap/authn-assurance/dogwood														
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MAY															

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 The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union's Horizon Programme under Grant Agreement No. 730941.

Abstract  
 Infrastructures and generic e-infrastructure services, yet it is desirable to avoid that it need not be re-computed. This document describes the assurance profiles for Infrastructures: REFEDS RAF Co-ordinated Assurance Profiles (RAF-CAP) specific profile addressing assurance information exchange.

### 5.3. Supplementary specific profiles for Infrastructures

Name	AARC Assam
SAML Identifier	https://aarc-project.eu/policy/authn-assurance/assam
Other Identifier(s)	AARC-Assam
Description	Identity substantially derived from social media or self-signup identity providers (outside the R&E community) on which no further policy controls or qualities are placed. Identity proofing and authenticator are substantially derived from upstream CSPs that are not under the control of the Infrastructure. The Infrastructure ensures uniqueness on the identifiers based on proprietary heuristics.
MUST	https://aarc-project.eu/policy/authn-assurance/assam
SHOULD	https://refeds.org/assurance/ID/unique

# Specific assurance information BETWEEN Infrastructures

- from REFEDS Assurance Framework: Cappuccino, Espresso
- from IGTF Assurance Profiles: BIRCH, DOGWOOD (<https://iana.org/assignments/loa-profiles>)
- from the AARC JRA1 use case analysis: Assam – derived from a user-held social identity

social identity assurance level is ‘unique’ to the Infrastructure use case here, since

- home IdPs in eduGAIN are not ‘social ID’
- but proxies can use + augment social IDs

*so out of REFEDS scope, but needed for AARC Infr*

**Expression of REFEDS RAF assurance components for identities derived from social media accounts**

## AARC-G041

Publication Date: 2018-03-04 (Final)  
 Authors: David Groep, Jens Jensen, Mikael Linden, Uros Stevanovic, Davide Vaghetti

Grant Agreement No.: 730941  
 Work Package: NA3  
 Task Item: TNA3.3  
 Lead Partner: Nikhef  
 Document Code: AARC-G041

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 The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community's Horizon2020 Programme under Grant Agreement No. 730941 (AARC2).

**Abstract**  
 Infrastructure Proxies may convey assurance information derived from multiple sources, one of which may be 'social identity' sources. This guidance explains under which conditions combination of assurance information and augmentation of identity data within the Infrastructure Proxy should result in assertion of the REFEDS Assurance Framework components "unique identifier", and when it may be appropriate to assert the "identity proofing" component value low.



### 3. RAF component recommendations

The above-listed consideration lead to the following guidance on asserting assurance component values:

The Infrastructure ID is based solely on a social account, and no additional information has been collected and no heuristics applied to change the assurance	Assert profile AARC-Assam <b>DO NOT assert any REFEDS RAF component values</b>
The Infrastructure ID is co-based on a social ID, but there are linked identities, either provided externally or based on information independently obtained by the proxy through heuristic or other business logic, that provide additional keys to 'who they are' and that the user is a single natural person and not sharing the account. The social ID itself is never re-assigned.	Assert profile AARC-Assam <b>ALSO assert</b> <a href="https://refeds.org/assurance/ID/unique">https://refeds.org/assurance/ID/unique</a>
The Infrastructure ID is co-based as above, but in addition either the Proxy or an 'upstream' identity source provides a valid email address through which the user can reasonably be expected to be reached	Assert profile AARC-Assam <b>ALSO assert BOTH</b> <a href="https://refeds.org/assurance/ID/unique">https://refeds.org/assurance/ID/unique</a> and <a href="https://refeds.org/assurance/IAP/low">https://refeds.org/assurance/IAP/low</a>

With this combination, the recipient of assurance information from a Proxy can derive unambiguously the status of an account which is based wholly or partially on social media authentication.

# High-assurance requirements – MNA3.5

- REFEDS RAF “Espresso” profile designed to support sensitive use cases
- BBMRI *definitely* known to need it (and in DoW)
  - biobanks by design contain sensitive data
  - need for stringent access control, based around reviews and ethics commissions
  - *same* researcher in *different* role may have different access rights even
- NA3 survey for more use cases: adds ELIXIR
- survey remains open for new cases – community engagement around Policy Dev Kit may identify more communities to consider risks
- based on REFEDS RAF pilot and ‘Espresso’, NA3 will do full (compliance) review with BBMRI

**Use Cases**

<b>Community</b>	<b>ELIXIR AAI</b>
<b>Contact</b>	Mikael Linden
<b>Description</b>	Some relying services of ELIXIR AAI require MFA when granting access. Principal issues relate to which attribute is associated with the MFA token, reliability, usefulness and cost. A pilot has been run to test the MFA token delivered to the user as an SMS.
<b>References</b>	Full discussion of scenarios and problems are discussed in the <a href="#">pilot roadmap (google doc)</a> .

<b>Community</b>	<b>BBMRI</b>
<b>Contact</b>	Petr Holub
<b>Description</b>	Issues identified with the REFEDS AF are related to <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• lack of prescribed attributes and</li> <li>• timely removal of attributes (1 day required rather than 1 month following termination of employment.)</li> </ul>
<b>References</b>	See <a href="#">document (Overleaf doc)</a> .



# Divergence and convergence – the AUP Alignment Study


Origin	Policy Base Owner	Policy Summary	EGI	BBMRI	OTSO	EUDAT	ELIRIR	HBP	OSG Comment	Price	Staff employees	RCUK		
1	EGI	You will only use the resources for research to perform work, or to research or to disseminate research results, or to provide policy and conditions of use of facilities.	3	2	0	3	3	2	Expanded: "Use of shared electronic resources" and "Professional activities" and "For research research"	2.4. "as defined by the Register."	850	1	1	775
2	EGI	You will provide appropriate acknowledgment of support or citation for your use of the resources or services provided for you by the facility.	3	2	2	3	3	2	Expanded: "Use of shared electronic resources" and "For research research"	2.4. "as defined by the Register."	850	0	0	400
3	EGI	You will not use the resources for any purpose that is unlawful and/or (attempts to) breach or circumvent any administrative or security controls.	3	1	3	3	3	1	Expanded: "Use of shared electronic resources" and "For research research"	2.4. "as defined by the Register."	750	1	1	420
4	EGI	You will not use the resources for any purpose that is unlawful and/or (attempts to) breach or circumvent any administrative or security controls.	3	0	3	3	3	2	Expanded: "Use of shared electronic resources" and "For research research"	2.4. "as defined by the Register."	850	2	2	800
5	EGI	You will protect your access credentials (e.g. private keys or access IDs).	3	0	3	3	3	3	Expanded: "Use of shared electronic resources" and "For research research"	2.4. "as defined by the Register."	750	2	1	700
6	EGI	You will keep all your registration information correct and up-to-date.	3	0	2	3	3	1	Expanded: "Use of shared electronic resources" and "For research research"	2.3. "as defined by the Register."	400	0	0	350
7	EGI	You will immediately report any known or suspected security breach or misuse of the resources or services or access credentials to the appropriate designated person.	3	0	2	3	3	1	Expanded: "Use of shared electronic resources" and "For research research"	2.3. "as defined by the Register."	450	0	1	500
8	EGI	You are the owner/contractor of your own work. There is no guarantee that the resources provided will be available at any time or that they will last.	3	0	3	3	3	1	Expanded: "Use of shared electronic resources" and "For research research"	2.3. "as defined by the Register."	470	0	0	530
9	EGI	You agree that these information, including personal data provided by you for registration purposes, may be used for administrative, operational, accounting, or research purposes.	3	0	3	3	3	1	Expanded: "Use of shared electronic resources" and "For research research"	2.3. "as defined by the Register."	750	1	1	420
10	HBP	Regarding privacy, you as a participant in clinical trials will have your personal data processed and stored by the facility.	0	1	0	3	3	3	Expanded: "Use of shared electronic resources" and "For research research"	2.3. "as defined by the Register."	750	1	1	420
11	EGI	You are liable for the consequences of your violation of any of these conditions of use, which may include but not limited to the reporting of your violation to your employer.	3	0	3	3	3	3	Expanded: "Use of shared electronic resources" and "For research research"	2.3. "as defined by the Register."	750	1	0	400
12	EUDAT	You must respect the privacy of other users for example, not to install software or information on, obtain copies of, or modify files, reports or services of other users.	0	2	0	3	3	3	Expanded: "Use of shared electronic resources" and "For research research"	2.3. "as defined by the Register."	3	0	0	3
13	PRACE	The User will have regard to the principles which govern the processing of personal data for the purposes and conduct the activities in an ethical manner.	0	1	0	3	3	3	Expanded: "Use of shared electronic resources" and "For research research"	2.3. "as defined by the Register."	3	0	0	3
14	PRACE	The User understands that the use of Resources by individuals at certain centres may be restricted by policies laid down by the Register or the Resource Provider.	0	0	0	3	3	3	Expanded: "Use of shared electronic resources" and "For research research"	2.3. "as defined by the Register."	3	0	0	3
15	BBMRI	Resource Provider may request that data derived from Samples/Data are transferred to such the appropriate national legal and jurisdiction. The national law of the Sample/Data Provider will apply.	0	3	0	3	3	3	Expanded: "Use of shared electronic resources" and "For research research"	2.3. "as defined by the Register."	3	0	0	3
16	HBP	of Southland, including any condition of law, rules, regulations, or other policies.	0	0	0	3	3	3	Expanded: "Use of shared electronic resources" and "For research research"	2.3. "as defined by the Register."	3	0	0	3

Support any known or loss or loss or credentials.

Phone number for possible for backing

Adds: EUDAT is not liable to any compensation in case of lost data or loss of service

Adds: Although efforts are made to maintain confidentiality, no guarantees are given. Expanded for PI under "Personal information and data privacy"



# Scaling Acceptable Use Policy and data release

impractical to present user 'click-through' screens on each individual service

Community specific terms & conditions

Community specific terms & conditions

Community conditions

RI Cluster-specific terms & conditions

**Common baseline AUP**  
**for e-Infrastructures and Research Communities**  
(current draft: JSPG Evolved AUP –  
leveraging comparison study and joint e-Infrastructure work)

Also picked up by others,  
e.g. FH VORARLBERG

This allows a layered approach to the construction of the AUP, where the AUP presented to the end-user (on enrolment or later) comprises both the generic JSPG-evolved version plus the community-specific additions.

The LS AAI shall present an Acceptable Use Policy also on behalf of its connected services and infrastructures.

The LS AAI operators shall present as the AUP:

- the common aims and purposes, i.e. the research or scholarship goals of the Life Sciences Research Infrastructures (in a few high-level sentences)  
**This text must be supplied by the Life Sciences community.**
- the list of 11 (eleven) items from the Evolved JSPG AUP [JSPGAUP2]
- a notice that enrolment into specific groups or subdivisions may require the user to sign supplementary terms and conditions, and
- that in specific circumstance also specific services *may* ask the user to sign additional conditions of use.

If the Life Sciences community agrees to any joint clauses (do not attempt to reverse privacy-enhancing technologies, for instance), these should be included in the LS AAI AUP.

## Relevant to communities and e-Infrastructures both

- what are the requisite policy elements and processes you need to define to manage a structured community?
- which of these are required to access general-purpose e-Infrastructures?
- which roles and responsibilities lie with the community 'management' to that the BPA proxy model will scale out?

*joint work with EGI-ENGAGE and EOSC-Hub projects and the EGI, PRACE, HBP, EUDAT communities*



## Community Membership Management Policy

- Introduction
- Definitions
- Individual Users
- Community Manager and other roles
- Community
  - Aims and Purposes
  - Membership
  - Membership life cycle: Registration
  - Membership life cycle: Assignment of attributes
  - Membership life cycle: Renewal
  - Membership life cycle: Suspension
  - Membership life cycle: Termination
- Protection and processing of Personal Data
- Audit and Traceability Requirements
- Registry and Registration Data
- References

### Introduction

*This policy is designed to support the expansion of open science in*



## Community Operations Security Policy

### 1 Introduction

This policy is effective from <insert date> and replaces two earlier security policy documents [R1]. This policy is one of a set of documents that together define the Security Policy [R2] and must be considered in conjunction with all the policy documents in the set.

This policy applies to the Community Manager and other designated Community management personnel. It places requirements on Communities and it governs their relationships with all Infrastructures with which they have a usage agreement. The Community management personnel must ensure awareness and acceptance, by the Community and its Users, of the responsibilities documented in this Policy.

### 2 Definitions

A Community is a group of individuals (Users), organised with a common purpose, jointly granted access to one or more Infrastructures. It may serve as an entity which acts as the interface between the individual Users and an Infrastructure. In general, the members of the Community will not need to separately negotiate access with Service Providers or Infrastructures (hereafter jointly called Infrastructures).

Examples of Communities include, but are not limited to: User groups, Virtual Organisations, Research Communities, Research Infrastructures, Virtual Research Communities, Projects, Communities authorised to use particular portals or gateways, and geographically organised communities.


### 3 Community Operations Security Policy

By participating in the Infrastructure, a Community Manager agrees to the conditions laid

## Main achievements in e-Researcher-centric Policy

Assurance Framework alignment	→	REFEDS RAF Pilot with production entities
	→	Profile-driven interop between Infrastructures achieved (AARC-G020)
Guideline: exchange of assurance information	→	Workflows can cross multiple infrastructures
Guideline: social media assurance components	→	Enable collaborative assurance with the community (and guide BPA implementers)
Acceptable Use policy scaling model and baseline	→	<i>Alignment model</i> recognized by LSAAI and major e-Infrastructures
<b>PY2</b>	Baseline AUP with major Infrastructures (EGI, EUDAT, PRACE, XSEDE) and communities	
	Deployment of assurance guideline and move to high-assurance use cases	

# Policy and Best Practices Harmonisation



The screenshot shows a website interface with four tabs: 'Architecture Guidelines', 'Policy Guidelines', 'Targeted Guidelines', and 'Upcoming Guidance'. The 'Policy Guidelines' tab is active. It lists three guidelines:

- AARC-G014 Security Incident Response Trust Framework for Federated Identity**  
Sirtfi provides a mechanism to identify trusted, operationally secure eduGAIN participants and facilitate effective incident response collaboration.  
[... more information ...](#)
- AARC-G015 Scalable Negotiator for a Community Trust Framework in Federated Infrastructures**  
The Snctfi framework identifies operational and policy requirements to help establish trust between an Infrastructure and identity providers either in an R&E Federation or in another Infrastructure, in each case joined via a Service Provider to Identity Provider proxy.  
[... more information ...](#)
- AARC-G021 Exchange of specific assurance information between Infrastructures**  
Infrastructures and generic e-Infrastructures compose an 'effective' assurance profile derived from several sources, yet it is desirable to exchange the resulting assurance assertion obtained between Infrastructures so that it need not be re-computed by a recipient Infrastructure or Infrastructure service



*excluding the FIM4R engagement work that was already described in the AEGIS & CEF presentation*


## Task 4

# Policy Development Engagement and Coordination

# Engagement and coordination with the global community



## Scalable Negotiator for a Community Trust Framework in Federated Infrastructures





Co-develop	/Guidelines
<p>Globally through</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WISE, SCI</li> <li>• REFEDS</li> <li>• IGTF</li> <li>• joint policy groups (with EGI, EOSC, WLCG)</li> </ul>	<p>Implement</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Adopt</b> guidelines</li> <li>• <b>Build on</b> collective work with EGI, EOSC-Hub, GEANT, and REFEDS</li> <li>• <b>Consult</b> with AARC team for targeted guidelines</li> </ul>

Basis for **policy development kit** – identify gaps in policy suite, coordinate best practice between peer Infrastructures, and leverage AARC templates

# Policy Development Kit

- Bring together a consistent suite
- based on e-Infrastructure best practices in particular EGI, WLCG, and the JSPG



## AARC Policy Development Kit

Task Plan & Notes: <https://wiki.geant.org/display/AARC/Policy+Development+Kit>  
 Author list: U. Stevanovic, H. Short, D. Groep, I. Neilson, I. Mikhailava

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>2</b>
Scope	2
Infrastructure Policies and Frameworks	3
<b>Frameworks</b>	<b>4</b>
Sirtfi Trust Framework	4
Research and Scholarship Entity Category	5
GÉANT Data Protection Code of Conduct	5
<b>Policies</b>	<b>6</b>
Top Level	7
Infrastructure Policy	7
Data Protection	7
Privacy Statement	8
Membership Management	8
Community Membership Management Policy	8
Acceptable Use Policy	9
Acceptable Authentication Assurance	9
Operational Security	10
Incident Response Procedure	10
<b>Policy Templates</b>	<b>10</b>
Top Level Infrastructure Policy Template	10
Membership Management Policy Template	15
Acceptable Authentication Assurance Policy Template	20
Acceptable Use Policy Template	21
Privacy Policy Template	22
Incident Response Procedure	24
<b>Additional Policies of Interest</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>References</b>	<b>26</b>

# Polity harmonisation


- Alignment and integration of e-Infrastructure AAI service offerings for (AARC-2) communities

→ encouraging harmonisation

→ communities are converging on more limited number of options

- AARC has a **unique position in providing neutral guidance**

and **maintaining community focus** across-infrastructure



Joint e-Infrastructure service for supporting the Life Sciences AAI

In response to the request for proposals by the Life Sciences Research Infrastructures, the joint e-Infrastructures (in alphabetical order EGI, EUDAT, and GEANT) would like to propose the following solution suite for use in the AARC2 pilot and in support of the initiative by the LS RIs to obtain funding for a sustained LS AAI to be proposed in January 2018.



*enabled by the Power of AARC*

## Main achievements in Policy Coordination and Engagement

Coordination through IGTF, WISE, REFEDS	→ Involvement with AARC across the globe, including XSEDE, OSG, HPCI, and EU Infra's (EGI, EUDAT, GEANT, PRACE)
Policy Development Kit	→ Ease implementation of gapless policy set for new communities based on <b>Snctfi</b>
FIM4R reinvigoration process	→ FIM4R 2018 paper gives recommendations for Infrastructures, federations operators, and funding agencies
Harmonisation	→ More joint AAI offerings and increased use of the 'shared service model'
<b>PY2</b>	<p>Evolve Policy Development Kit with a community risk assessment method to guide adoption of appropriate policy</p> <p>Support communities and use cases in policy interpretation through Guidelines</p>

## Challenges

- Policy is – still – usually last on the community’s priority list, yet we **need community involvement** to develop appropriate policy

*provide targeted or bespoke guidance first, and abstract from it later when possible*

*though when a policy need arises, the community wants applicable policy and processes instantly!*

- Same small group of experts gets to develop most if not all of the policies – general **lack of distributed skilled expertise**

*through e-Infrastructures (alongside AARC2 pilots) and communities aim to **identify the people that have policy interest and expertise**, e.g. by pushing it out alongside other thematic service interaction with the communities*



## Operational Security and Incident Response

- Increased adoption of Sirtfi now permits real-life exercise of the procedures
- PY2: *Extension of OpSec concept to attribute authority operations security for communities*

## Service-centric policies

- Policy guidelines, support for AAI proxy operations, and GDPR risk assessment for communities
- PY2: *Develop assessment model based on SCI – to compare against audit based model for trust*

## e-Researcher-Centric Policies

- Assurance framework in pilot, cross-infrastructure interop profiles defined, AUP study complete
- PY2: *Move to agreement on a layered AUP and a matching baseline common to Infrastructures*

## Policy Development Engagement and Coordination

- Policy Development Kit under way, reinvigorated FIM4R for strategic directions, politics alignment
- PY2: *Risk assessment methodology for communities, targeted guidance policy for communities*

# Thank you

## Any Questions?

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