

Authentication and Authorisation for Research and Collaboration

Beyond the finish onwards to the policy horizon

Consolidating policy and best practice activities from NA3

David Groep


NA3 coordinatior Nikhef

Nikhef

AARC2AHM5 meeting Abingdon March 2019

How can policy help you ease collaboration?






Responding to incidents – sharing relevant information



 Sirtfi take-up at proper organizational level **Beyond basic Sirtfi**

- federation-level engagement in process
- *Sirtfi+* registry broadens global base
- engagement in trust groups valuable for federated collective response



organisation

to the Federated R&E Community given that it is considered unlikely that all Federation Participants would participate in Trust Groups as described above.

	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	application with peer	groups facilitate the exc
Trust Group Benefit	Proposal for the Federated R&E Community	vetting	These groups typically additional face-to-face t
Hust Group Denenit	Proposal for the rederated NaL Community	Individual membership.	A high degree of trust le intelligence sharing and
Access to security contacts	Work should continue to promote the Sirtfi framework and identify contacts for Federation Participants. In	Invitation only	incident response. Indiv play an active role and background. Trust is ac meaning that if an empl their job, the benefits ar employer.
	addition, contacts for Federations and Interfederations	by participating	These groups facilitate distributed infrastructure be a single organisation Individuals are typically

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from DNA3.2 Report on Security Incident Response and Cybersecurity in Federated Authentication Scenarios



		16-11-2018				
		Incident	Response	Test Mo	del for	Role Test 1
						Identity 1
In AARC2	we will further the work undertaken in AARC and provide a fran	Deliverable MNA3,3,3	ations - Si	mulation	#2	IdP1
Month	What	Contractual Date: Actual Date: Grant Agreement No.:	N/A 16-11-2018 730941		org/signi	SP1
9	Incident Response Test Model for Organizations MNA3.3	Work Package: Task Item: Lead Partner:	NA3 CERN			SP3
10	Incident Simulation #1 Report	https://aarc-pro			oleth	
19	Incident Simulation #2 Report	https://aarc-pro	MWA Telescope Collaboration	AAF	SP https://wiki.mwatelesc ope.org	SP2
?	Guideline on Incident Response for Federation Participants	Draft at https://	UK Fed		Federation	
22	Report on Security Incident Response DNA3.2	Incide	ines on nt Resp unities		ated Sec for Rese	arch

'AARC-G051', maybe ?

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WISE Community: Security Communication Challenges Coordination WG (SCCC-WG)

Introduction and background

Maintaining trust between different infrastructures and domains depends largely on predictable responses by all parties involved. Many frameworks – e.g. SCI and Sirtfi – and groups such as the coordinated e-Infrastructures, the IGTF, and REFEDS, all promote mechanisms to publish security contact information, and have either explicit or implicit expectations on their remit, responsiveness,

Attribute Authority Operations and 'MMS assessment'

		Autho	rities and other issue	ers of access-
2	On a national Christolin a a	granti	ng statements	AARC Blueprint Unstreament of Announcement of
3.	Operational Guidelines			
3.1.	Naming			Univ Antonion Soviete
3.2.	Attribute Management and A	Attribute Release		
3.3.	Attribute Assertions			
3.4.	Operational requirements	3.3. Attribute Assertions Publication Date Authors:	e 2018-11-22 David Groep;David Kelsey;Hannah Sho	rt;Mischa Sallé;Uros Stevanovic;Stefan
3.4.1.	Key Management	Paetow;Maarter		
3.4.2.	Network Configuration	Document Code		
3.5.	Site Security	 Assertions provided by an AA must be the identified AA, or be transmitted even 		9 ,
3.6.	Metadata publication	the identified AA, or be transmitted over server has been authenticated, and pre	C I I	
	•			
3.7.	Assessments and auditability			
3.8.	Privacy and confidentiality	Push model Where the protocol supports it, enable protection	an also of the messages of	opyoyod over the
3.9.	Compromise and	established channel.	on also of the messages of	
	disaster recovery	Good examples: SAML Attribute Query should	enable message signing	and use TLS.
Λ	,		5 5 5	
4.	Relying Party obligations	Dull medal		
		Pull model		

As a good example: LDAP should enable TLS protection of the channel



All what we have, and what we 'lump in' here (since it has nowhere else to go)

- SCI v2 and the assessment methodology
- Managing the proxy: data minimization, why the proxy can release attributes and still be data-minimalistic ("Interest of users to reduce the release of personal, as well as the potential risks for the users info vs. the need of resources to have proper accounting and security")
- Policy Development Kit how to help infrastructures meet their requirements on traceability and much more

should G021 ("exchange of assurance information between infrastructures") go here as well?



Service policies: helping peer-reviewed self-assessment in SCI and more



SCI assessment	framework is the	ere		A A Infrastructure Name: 2 Prepared By:	B	C <insert n<br=""><insert n<="" th=""><th></th><th>EF</th><th></th><th></th><th></th></insert></insert>		EF			
			3 Reviewed By:			<insert name=""></insert>					
			4	4 5 Operational Security [OS] 6							
manning to ISO	27k is quite roug	h thou	ah 🛛				Maturity				
mapping to 150	27K is quite roug	n, thou					Value Σ				
				7							
	в	L.	, u	OS1 - Security Person/Team			#REF!	#			
A	D	C	0	- Risk Management Process			#REF!	#			
	Completeness in definition in	SIRTEL v1.0 (dec		- Security Plan (architecture, policies, contr	ols)		2.0				
SCI-V1	whitenaper	2015)	ISO 27002·2013	3.1 - Authentication		3					
				3.2 - Dynamic Response		1					
https://wiki.geant	https://wiki.geant.org/display/WISE/SCI		cuments	3.3 - Access Control							
		subsections	1	3.4 - Physical and Network Security							
Operational Security [OS]		545500015	-	3.5 - Risk Mitigation							
OS1 - Security Model	ves	OS1	9. Access control	3.6 - Confidentiality							
OS1.1 - Authentication	,			3.7 - Integrity and Availability	Q	1	1.0				
OS1.2 - Authorisation				3.8 - Disaster Recovery							
OS1.3 - Access Control				3.9 - Compliance Mechanisms						PKIX RFC 3647	Persistent registry (community membership) implementation and
OS1.4 - Confidentiality				- Security Patching		1	1.0		rganisation	 rendering 1.3.1 	assessment hints specific obligations are put on the
OS1.5 - Integrity				4.1 - Patching Process		-			should		registry, so a persistent organsiation is needed to take
OS1.6 - Availability				4.2 - Patching Records and Communication							care of these requirements. A community may outsource such
OS1.7 - Compliance Mechanisms				- Vulnerability Mgmt		1	0.7				obligations to a trusted third party or operator.
OS2 - Security Patching	yes	OS2	12.5 Control of ope	rationa5.1 - Vulnerability Process							The (collection of) membership management and assertion-
OS2.1 - Patching Process				5.2 - Dynamic Response							issuing systems and services constitutes the Issuing Authority
OS2.2 - Patching Records & Communication				- Intrusion Detection		2			sion of key	3.2, 4.7, 6.1.1,	The registration process should be such that the apparent applicant
OS3 - Vulnerability Mgmt	yes	OS3	12.6 technical vulne	erability- Regulate Access (including suspension)		1			cation 		enrolled corresponds to the entity that is supposed to be in the
OS3.1 - Vulnerability Process				- Contact Information		-			vith users		registry.
OS3.2 - Dynamic Response				9.1 Contact Usars					ed, and the chair	1	The registration data and any issued assertions constitute the
OS4 - Intrusion Detection	yes	OS4	13. communication	securit A, B, C 3.1	Sufficient informatio					nt 3.2, 5.5	'credential of the user'. The registrar is responsible for all
OS5 - Regulate Access			9 access control	archived sur entity and t				in the future, claiming the same name, i d indeed the same entity as the original			vetting and must record this information for as long as needed

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http://wise-community.org/sci/

https://wiki.eugridpma.org/Main/AssuranceAssessment

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introduction video – training – 9 reference templates – continuous improvement

Get Started with Policies

A Moodle course is available to learn more about Policies for the AARC Blueprint Architecture and videos from this course are also available on the AARC playlist on YouTube GÉANTty.

A PDK promo video is also available to share.

Supporting documents are available below for download.

Download Material

Show 100 v entries				Search:		
Document 🔶	Who should complete the template?	÷	Audience 🔶	Description	L	Link 🔶
Top Level Infrastructure Policy	Infrastructure Management		All Infrastructure Participants (abides by)	This policy template defines the roles of actors in the Research Infrastructure and binds the policy set together		Google Doc
Incident Response Procedure	Infrastructure Management & Security Contact		Infrastructure Security Contact, Services (abides by)	This template procedure provides a step-by-step breakdown of actions to take following a security incident.		Google Doc
Membership Management Policy	Infrastructure Management		Research Community (abides by)	This policy template defines how Research Communities should manage their members, including registration and expiration.		Google Doc
Acceptable Authentication Assurance	Infrastructure Management		Research Community, Services (abide by)	This is a placeholder for the Infrastructure to determine rules for the acceptable assurance profiles of user credentials.		Google Doc
Risk Assessment	Infrastructure Management, Services & Security Contact		Infrastructure Management (completes)	This table can be used as a starting point for identifying whether a full Data Protection Impact Assessment is required.		Google Doc
Dolicy on the	Infrastructure Mananement & Data		Desearch Community	This document defines the obligations on Infrastructure Participants when	e	Soonle

https://aarc-project.eu/policies/policy-development-kit/



All what we have, and what we 'lump in' here (since it has nowhere else to go)

• Assurance

• Acceptable use policy and guidance

• FIM4R

Assurance – standard profiles and 'untangling spaghetti'


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- REFEDS RAF profiles (feasible assurance from all over R&E federations as far as we can!)
- inter-infrastructure profiles and relying-party oriented profiles (IGTF BIRCH, DOGWOOD)
- how to express social media assurance, for citizen science and in support of account linking

AARC-G041		(i Pro	ofiles				5
Expression of REFEDS RAF assurance compo from social media accounts	onents for identities derive	ad AAR	C	5.1. 5.2.	REFEDS R			s	
3. RAF component re	ecommenda	tions	n.org/assuranc	5.3. 5.4.	Attribute fre	eshness assurance compo	onent		8
The above-listed consideration lead to the follo	owing guidance on asserti	ng assurance	n.org/assuranc	5.5.	Implementa	ation notes	or pu	t AARC-G021 here?	8
component values:			ition.se/loa/2fa			skolfederation.se-	2fa [https://www.skolfederat	io
The Infrastructure ID is based solely on a social	Assert profile AARC-Assam		d.se/policy/assu	rance	e/al1	SWAMID-AL1	[https://www.sunet.se/sw	va
account, and no additional information has been collected and no heuristics applied to	S RAF component	d.se/policy/assu	e/policy/assurance/al2 fi		SWAMID-AL2 Sirtfi		[https://www.sunet.se/s [https://refeds.org/sirtfi		
change the assurance		sirtfi							
The Infrastructure ID is co-based on a social ID, but there are linked identities, either provided	Assert profile AARC-Assam ALSO assert		authn-assuranc	authn-assurance/aspen		IGTF-ASPEN		[https://www.igtf.net/ap	
externally or based on information independently obtained by the proxy through	https://refeds.org/assura	nce/ID/unique	authn-assuranc	e/biro	ch IGTF-BIRCH		[https://www.igtf.net/ap/	aι
independently obtained by the bloky through		https://igtf.net/a	p/authn-assuranc	e/cec	lar	IGTF-CEDAR	[https://www.igtf.net/ap/	aι
		https://igtf.net/a	p/authn-assuranc	e/dog	gwood	IGTF-DOGWOOD	[https://www.igtf.net/ap/	aı

Untangling Assurance Spaghetti: Comparison Guide to Identity Assurance Mappings for Infrastructures



https://aarc-project.eu/guidelines/aarc-i050/

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WISE Baseline AUP – and how to apply it for your Infrastructure

5.2. Example

The following example shows a co

the appropriate Acceptable Use Pe

This Acceptable Use Policy and

govern your access to and use (

data) of the resources and serv

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AARC-I044

- Includes the final WISE Baseline AUP text
- for both 'community-first' and 'user-first' MMS services (attribute authorities)
- examples make it concrete

Quick take-up by e-Infras (both global and national)

3. The WISE Baseline AUP

The WISE Baseline AUP¹ in its preamble and final clauses, it given below. The blue text elements should be substituted in-line, whereas the green elements are optional and need to be provided only when needed, e.g. based on the guidance in this document.

Acceptable Use Policy and Conditions of Use

This Acceptable Use Policy and Conditions of Use ("AUP") defines the rules and conditions that qovern your access to and use (including transmission, processing, and storage of data) of the resources and services ("Services") as granted by {community, agency, or infrastructure name} for the purpose of {describe the stated goals and policies governing the intended use}.

<To further define and limit what constitutes acceptable use, the community, agency, or infrastructure may optionally add additional information, rules or conditions, or references thereto, here or at the placeholder below. These additions must not conflict with the clauses 1-10 below, whose wording and numbering must not be changed.>

 You shall only use the Services in a manner consistent with the purposes and limitations described above; you shall show consideration towards other users including by not causing harm to the Services: you have an obligation to collaborate in the resolution of issues arising

the purpose of studying short-range nucleon-nucleon correlations by means of electron-induced two-proton knockout from Helium-3.

... follows Baseline AUP standard ten clauses ...

The administrative contact for this AUP is: he3epp@nikhef.nl The security contact for this AUP is: security@nikhef.nl The privacy statements (e.g. Privacy Notices) are located at: https://www.nikhef.nl/privacy

Our collective wisdom from AARC2



Description of deliverables

AARC-1044 Implementers Guide to the WISE Baseline Acceptable Use Policy

Applying the Develop ADP to concrete use cases may appear shoightforward, but there are many edge cases and specific chromotonices where both antices the other of user-friendly-ess as well as be compared and paratical. In this write-up, we my to give blats how to use the VASE Baseline commaning fors as well as user first membership management searches a case information ...

AARC-G048 Guidelines for Secure Operation of Attribute Authorities and other issuers of a

these publishes describe the minimum requirements and recommendators for the secure operation of Althouse Anthrophes and similar services purpose of obtaining access to infrastructure services. Stated compliance with these guidelines may help to establish trust between issuers and ... more information ...

AARC-6042 Data Protection Impact Assessment - an initial guide for communities

This report presents the results of the desk study on the evaluation of risks to (personal) data protection as considered in the European Regulation (GDPR), for infrastructures and their service providers that heverage federated identity management (EM) to connect research *connect research connect research conn*

AARC-G041 Expression of REFEDS RAF assurance components for identities derived from accounts

AARC-G021 Exchange of specific assurance information between Infrastructures

AARC-1050 Comparison Guide to Identity Assurance Mappings for Infrastructures

DNA3.1 - Report on the coordination of accounting data sharing amongst Infrastructures (initial phase) - (M12) DNA3.2 - Report on Security Incident Response and Cybersecurity in Federated Authentication Scenarios (M22) DNA3.3 - Accounting and Traceability in Multi-Domain Service Provider Environments (M23) DNA3.4 - Recommendations for e-Researcher-Centric Policies and Assurance (M24) D3.1 : DNA3.2 - Report on Security Incident Response [22] Report on Security Incident Response and Cybersecurity in Federated Authentication Scenarios

D3.2 : DNA3.3- Accounting and Traceability in Multi-Domain Service Provider Environments [23]

Accounting and Traceability in Multi-Domain Service Provider Environments

D3.3 : DNA3.4 - Recommendations for e-Researcher-Centric Policies and Assurance [24]

Recommendations for e-Researcher-Centric Policies and Assurance

D3.4 : DNA3.1 - Report on the coordination of accounting data sharing amongst Infrastructures (initial phase) [12]

This document assess privacy #Home > Foldes > Fo

ensure smooth and secure serv Policy Development Kit

Accessing, using, and operating services for research in Coday's world, as a rule, is inherently distributed, where users access resources outside their Home Organizations. In this complex environment, the question of trust for users, resource providers, and infrastrictures peramount.

A set of policy documents is necessary to regulate and facilitate this trust. These policies outline the operational measures undertaken by the infrastructure to properly provide services. The policies principally cover security measures, user management and data protection.

What is the Policy Development Kit?

This material is provided to support Research Infrastructures in adopting or enhancing a porty set that regulates the operation and use of an Authentitation and Authorisation Infrastructure in line with the AARC Bluephrt Architecture. The policies are there to providing a starting point, so that Research Infrastructures do not have to re-invent the wheel:

With a wide range of identity assurance frameworks to choose from, the most appropriate choice of assurance profile for a use case (or. the social and community context in which the assurance is needed) may be viewed as confusing. The choice of Cappuccino or Espresso Get Started with Policies Assam from the AARC social media assurance, Birch and Dogwood from the Interoperable Global Trust Federation, Silver and Branze from both Kantara and NIST SP800-63 – all of these merit a policy mapping and comparison framework. In this whilepaper, we identify the implicit trust assumptions (in research and collaboration frameworks, the R&E identity federations, general private sector frameworks and e-government schemes) and present a way of comparing these frameworks. ... more information ...

plus all our AARC1 wisdom!

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and the AARC-G051 incident response process draft?



OpSec	Attribute authority operations practice also for Infra proxies
	Trust groups and the exchange of (account) compromise information: beyond Sirtfi
Infra- centric	traceability and accounting data-collection policy framework based on SCI, providing self-assessment methodology and comparison matrix for infrastructure services information obtained from the proxy good enough for data protection, security, &c
Resear	Baseline AUP with major Infrastructures (EGI, EUDAT, PRACE, XSEDE) and communiti
cher- centric	Deployment of assurance guidelines and assess high-assurance use cases (BBMRI)
Engage ment	Evolve Policy Development Kit and a simpler top-level security policy with a community 'assessment method' or 'guide' to the adoption of appropriate policy
	Support communities and use cases in policy interpretation through Guidelines



For the **"service-centric" work** a final touch is needed on how to apply the frameworks and help interoperability

- Assessment methodology for SCI and how is peer-reviewed self-assessment better then pushing everyone through ISO27k
- How to apply data minimization in attribute release from the membership services

For Assurance

- Do our high-assurance in REFEDS ("Espresso") actually meet the target community need?
- Do we need to update G021 ("Exchange of specific assurance information between Infrastructures"), which is also on Zenodo, before we close?

Incident Response: we should publish draft response procedure before the end (as 'G051')?

Adoption – how to promote that for ourselves and the review?





Policy Development Kit showing up without me prompting in a Dutch collaborative science presentation ... And much more (do we want a list?):

- PDK adoption: by HDF, WLCG
- MMS services adopting AUP
- LSAAI R&S+DPCoCo
- EOSC-HUB and WLCG policy framework revision
- AUP by many (even by a FH)
- FIM4R impact
- •

Beyond AARC – how can the good work continue and thrive?



- EOSC-HUB: mainly WP4.4 "ISM", WP5.1 "AAI", and WP13 "Virtual Access" for RCauth
- GN4-3: T5.1.4 eduGAIN security operations and readiness
- GN4-3: T5.4 enabling communities

Without specific funding but *endorsed by funded infrastructures* & *projects*:

- IGTF
- Collaboration Agreement GN4-* and EOSC-HUB
- WISE
- AEGIS
- REFEDS
- FIM4R

Complementary sources: national e-Infrastructures, domain funding, ESFRIs and EOSC projects



Sirtfi

- already in a REFEDS WG (Sirtfi+)
- 'response model' to the extent it involves federations can go here as well
- actual incident response plus readiness challenges on federated ID side go with new eduGAIN security capability

Communications challenges for security that involve also the Infrastructures

- WISE, specifically the new SCCC WG
- needs some love and care from all Infrastructures

Infrastructure-specific challenges remain infrastructure, but coordinated through SCCClike the IGTF RAT CC



SCI Assessment

- WISE SCI WG, with assessment in the IGTF
- support through EOSC-HUB WP4.4 and GN4-3T5.4
- but obviously also from PRACE, XSEDE, GridPP, SURF, &c

Assurance Profiles – from federations to Infrastructures, and between R/E infrastructures

- the 'feasible' assurance and alignment with IdPs and federations belongs in REFEDS RAF
- assurance requirements of, and exchange of assurance between, infrastructures: in IGTF

AUP and Terms of Use

- the home is WISE SCI, but it needs care and nourishment from EOSCHUB and GN4-3
- extends beyond just WP4.4/T5.4 and involves e.g. also eduTEAMS, CheckIn, B2ACCESS



Data Protection and GDPR – service centric policy support

- we should lean heavily on AndrewC and the TF-DPR, but more is needed
- risk-assessment methodology for infrastructures and communities
- consultancy role for new communities to enable use of the infrastructures -> mailing list?
- joint GN4-3 + EOSC-HUB + WLCG effort, homed (for lack of anything else) in AEGIS?

Tuning the policy development kit

- the WISE SCI WG can coordinate, but the effort should come from somewhere
- again GN4-3 + EOSC-HUB (EGI, EUDAT) seem the natural choice, with input from PRACE
- other sources have been very successful as well: HDF, GridPP, SURF

For the rest and new things needed, leverage GN-EOSCH collaboration agreement & AEGIS?

• one-on-one consulting with communities highly appreciated also beyond AEGIS, but must be and be seen as neutral (maybe a FIM4R or WISE WG? or RDA?)



- Coherency of vision and an umbrella for Collaborative policy work will be more challenging
- Exploit personal overlap in the various groups (and cross-membership of lists)
- Provide a forum for cross-fertilization through continued joint workshops



Thank you Any Questions?

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© GÉANT on behalf of the AARC project. The work leading to these results has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under Grant Agre