Information Security 3: Who you gonna call?

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Nikhef



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R&E federation and eduGAIN – and the wonderful world of this session



eduGAIN – many countries & economic regions with an R&E identity federation



full of valuable resources (data, network, services)



... yet incident response has to be global (since the miscreants certainly are \otimes) ...



graphics sources: map technical.edugain.org; federation drawing: Hannah Short, CERN; Infrastructure logos: AARC Pilot use cases



Incidents spread through the community

We live & breath federation!

- communities have access to • services in many sites, in countries across the globe,
- which is anyway better than before federated login, where users had accounts (all with the same password) everywhere,
- but the spread of incidents, and • finding good targets, remains as easy as it ever was!

Some of the sites/companies/providers known to have been at the receiving end of an attack: rr.com

rutgers.edu

sdsc.edu

seagull.net

stanford.edu

technion.ac.il

telia.com

uci.edu

The broader view

berkeley.edu gatech.edu bonet.se iastate.edu brandeis.edu jhu.edu bredbandsbolaget.se ki.se kralovopolska.cz brown.edu bu.edu kth.se liu.se cam.ac.uk liv.ac.uk cern.ch chalmers.se lu.se cisco.com mit.edu columbia.edu naqua.se csbnet.se nasa.gov desy.de nikhef.nl epfl.ch pitt.edu

ucsc.edu ucsd.edu uiuc.edu umea.se simons-rock.edu umearc.se skanova.com umn.edu skogsbrynet.se umu.se songnetworks.se unige.ch uta.fi utk.edu uu.se uchicago.edu wsmr.army.mil ucolorado.edu


This is just a small sample; from August 2003 through March 2005 something like a thousand sites were attacked.

slide with site names: Stakkato incident – investigation by Leif Nixon ^{13/57}

NS 🗱

But what appears trivial








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... may not be so ...





AARC https://aarc-project.eu

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
So who do you call?



- Do you follow only the network?
 - whois data, abuse contacts in RIPEDB, and ... pray
- **Or**: do you follow the community?
 - look at authorization log and find the community contact in the VOID card
 - community will have to look for the user, meanwhile the incident goes on
- and do you contact your peers?
 - call EGI CSIRT (always a good idea) and share IoCs to protect likely victims
- and do you contact the identity provider mitigate issue at source?
 - use federation meta-data to find a trusted contact point with Sirtfi
 - involve the eduGAIN support desk security function to get global reach

Sirtfi is there today – 561 parties joined, in 28 federations





IAM Online Europe



Incident Response


- Assure confidentiality of information exchanged
- Identify trusted contacts
- Guarantee a response during collaboration



graphics source: AARC2 DNA3.2 Report on Incident Response in FIM; data: technical.edugain.org

Incident response process evolution in federations







AARC https://aarc-project.eu

https://aarc-project.eu/guidelines/aarc-i051/

Test model for federated incident response

defines the model actors in a global test incident





parties involved in response challenge

Report-out see https://wiki.geant.org/display/AARC/Incident+Response+Test+Model+for+Organizations





Trusted Introducer and TF-CSIRT

- 2-3 Reaction Tests per year
- supported by web click infrastructure, but requires (team) authentication Nationally, e.g. the SURFcert challenges
- annual response challenges, just reply to email to a (traceable) ticket
 IGTF RAT Communications Challenges
- every 1-2 years
- in parallel with continuous operational monitoring

EGI CSIRT: both comms challenges and security service challenges

- are the contacts in GOCDB correct and responsive?
- do the service providers know what to do if a real incident strikes?




Communication Challenge 2018 Results

- 23/272 clicks within 1 minute (8%)
- 101/272 clicks within 10 minutes (37%)
- 179/272 clicks within 1 hour (66%)
- 214/272 clicks within 4 hours (79%)
- 234/272 clicks within 1 day (86%)
- 252/272 clicks within 4 days (93%)
- 261/272 clicks within 7+ days (96%)
- 2 clicks at 39 days...
- 9 without direct clicks

Working-hour wise, these numbers are even better!



Can a coordinated service provider federation do better?



Go to the Tuesday morning security session to find out!

www.egi.eu





WISE Community: Security Communication Challenges Coordination WG (SCCC-WG)

Introduction and background

Maintaining trust between different infrastructures and domains depends largely on predictable responses by all parties involved. Many frameworks – e.g. SCI and Sirtfi – and groups such as the coordinated e-Infrastructures, the IGTF, and REFEDS, all promote mechanisms to publish security contact information, and have either explicit or implicit expectations on their remit, responsiveness, and level of confidentiality maintained. However, it is a well-recognised fact that data that is not

will be a **joint** working group by WISE, SIG-ISM, REFEDS, and the IGTF

Let's communicate! wise-community.org aarc-project.eu csirt.egi.eu technical.edugain.org



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